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CASE BRIEF:
SCHEIDLER V. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN,
INC.
Amee Lakhani
In a recent case, Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court established the inapplicability of
RICO actions in the protestor context, and this decision will
significantly impact the legal options clinics have to ensure their clients
access to legal and safe abortions.' The Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)2 has recently become the preferred
legal vehicle for establishing civil and criminal liability in a number of
situations involving allegedly extortionate conduct.3 RICO was initially
enacted to combat against organized crime enterprises.4 Increasingly,
RICO has been applied more expansively, most notably as a tool for
alleging extortion against pro-life protesters who block access to
abortion clinics. 5 In an opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Supreme
Court in Scheidler held that threats of violence, standing alone and not
in furtherance of robbery or extortion plots, do not qualify as an offense
under RICO.6 The Court's 2006 decision put an end to over twenty
years of litigation over the applicability of RICO to abortion protestors.
'Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1264 (2006).
2 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
3 Gerald E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 661, 661 (1987). "One of the most controversial statutes in the federal criminal
code is that entitled 'Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,' known
familiarly by its acronym, RICO. Passed in 1970 as title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, RICO has attracted much attention because of its draconian
penalties, including innovative forfeiture provisions; its broad draftsmanship, which
has left it open to a wide range of applications, not all of which were foreseen or
intended by the Congress that enacted it; and the sometimes draconian prosecutions
that have been brought in its name." Id
4 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
5 See generally Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 63 F.3d 863 (9th Cir.
1995) (reversing judgment for abortion clinic that filed civil action for extortion under
RICO against abortion protesters); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868
F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming judgment for abortion clinic that brought action
for extortion under RICO against -antiabortion activists); Town of Brookline v.
Operation Rescue, 762 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1991) (granting pro-life advocates'
motion to dismiss town's action for alleged racketeering and extortion under RICO).
6 Scheidler, 126 S. Ct. at 1273.
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The respondents in Scheidler, the National Organization for
Women and Reproductive Health Clinics, brought an action under
RICO asserting that some pro-life individuals and organizations had
engaged in physically violent anti-abortion activities that were intended
to disrupt activities at abortion clinics, and that these activities violated
RICO because they amounted to extortion under the Hobbs Act.7 The
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, determined that the Hobbs
Act criminalizes violent acts performed in furtherance of robbery or
extortion, or in an attempt or conspiracy to commit robbery or
extortion.8 The Court held that the language of the Hobbs Act does not
define a stand-alone offense for acts of violence. 9 The Court also found
that Congress' intent was not to criminalize acts of violence, standing
alone, under the Hobbs Act.10 This decision will likely have a
significant impact on cases brought against abortion protesters under
RICO and the Hobbs Act going forward. Given the Court's narrowing
of what constitutes extortion for purposes of the Hobbs Act, the
predicate offense most commonly used to support RICO claims against
abortion protesters, it will be essentially impossible for plaintiffs
bringing cases on these grounds to succeed."'
I. RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS ACT
Although RICO was originally enacted to combat against organized
crime, the courts have expanded RICO's applicability to a wide variety
of situations. 12 Plaintiffs are the biggest proponent for the expansion of
RICO because the law permits private civil suits for RICO violations
with remedies including treble damages and reasonable attorney's
fees.' 3 RICO prohibits the use or investment of any income derived
from racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt;
14
7 Id. at 1269.
8 Scheidler, supra note 6.
9 Id. see 18 U.S.C.S. § 1951 (2000).
10 Scheildler, supra note 6; see 18 U.S.C.S. § 1951 (2000).
1 Andrew H. Nelson, An Offer They Couldn't Refuse: Rolling Back RICO Through a
Direct Interpretation of Hobbs Act Extortion, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1239, 1241 (2004).
12 Alexander M. Parker, Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L. J. 819,
819 (1996). "RICO suits have gone beyond the underworld of organized crime and
have become common in areas such as common commercial fraud, securities fraud,
and antitrust violations." Id.
3 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000).
14 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
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makes it unlawful for anyone to acquire or maintain interest in, or
control of, an enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce
through racketeering activity; 15 and unlawful to conduct an enterprise
through racketeering activity. 16 Furthermore, RICO makes it unlawful
for anyone to conspire to violate any of these provisions.
17
Accordingly, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was
involved in "racketeering" as a predicate to a RICO violation.
"Racketeering" requires that the defendant commit certain illegal
predicate acts. is In cases where RICO has been used against abortion
protesters, plaintiffs have brought their claims using extortion under the
Hobbs Act as the predicate offense. 19 The Hobbs Act makes it a crime
to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by robbery or extortion, or to
conspire to do so, and also makes it a crime to commit or threaten
physical violence to anyone or anything in furtherance of a plan to
violate the section. 20 Until Scheidler, some courts had interpreted both
RICO and the Hobbs Act extortion broadly and awarded injunctions
and damages against abortion protesters.21
II. SCHEIDLER LITIGATION HISTORY
In 1986, the National Organization for Women (National Organization)
and Reproductive Health Clinics brought a lawsuit against Operation
Rescue for its violent activities in obstructing access to reproductive
health clinics. 22 Operation Rescue extremists "vowed to stop at nothing
to prevent abortions from being performed,, 23 and applied violent
24
tactics including blockades and kidnapping. Among the protestors
were Joseph Scheidler, Andrew Scholberg, and Timothy Murphy, who
together formed the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) in the 1980's as
"5 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2000).
16 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
'7 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000).
8 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(b) (2000). A predicate act is defined as any act which is
indictable under the provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code, including, but
not limited to, bribery, counterfeiting, theft, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, and
obstruction of justice. Id.
19 Parker, supra note 12, at 820.
20 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000).
21 Parker, supra note 12, at 822.
22 Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256-62 (1994).
23 Fay Clayton & Sara N. Love, NOW v. Scheidler: Protecting Women's Access to
Reproductive Health Services, 62 ALB. L. REv. 967, 969 (1999).
24 Id. at 969-72.
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a nationwide organizational tool to promote anti-abortion beliefs.25
PLAN wrote and distributed anti-abortion manuals and held
conventions throughout the country to encourage protestors to assist in
closing abortion clinics by interfering with their operation. 26 In an
attempt to terminate PLAN's assault on abortion clinics, the National
Organization filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois alleging that
PLAN encouraged and committed unlawful activities in order to
interfere with the business operations of reproductive health clinics.
27
The National Organization alleged that these activities were in violation
of RICO, the Sherman Antitrust Act, as well as a variety of state laws,
and that the purpose of these activities was to put reproductive health
clinics out of business. 28 The District court dismissed the antitrust
claim on the grounds that the defendants were not acting based on an
economic motive, but rather acting in attempt to influence government
action.29 The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' RICO claim due to the
fact that PLAN's activities were politically motivated and that the
defendants' actions towards reproductive health clinics were not aimed
at obtaining money, but rather at furthering the anti-abortion cause by
limiting the availability of abortion services.30 The court held that
defendants' lacked the requisite economic motive "to the extent that
some profit-generating purpose must be alleged" for RICO to be
applicable.
III. NOW I
The National Organization appealed this dismissal first to the Seventh
Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's ruling,32 and then again to the
United States Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of the
lower court regarding the RICO claim in an opinion that is now known
as NOW I.3 3 The Supreme Court held that an enterprise for purposes of
RICO did not require an economic motive, and that as a result, the fact
that PLAN intended to effectuate a political change as opposed to gain
25 Id. at 974-75.
26 Id.
27 Clayton, supra note 23 at 979.; Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d
612, 615 (7th Cir. 1992).
28 Id.
29 Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 940 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
30 Id. at 943.
31 Id
32 Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1992).
33 Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 (1994).
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a monetary benefit, did not bar the National Organization from
pursuing a RICO claim. 34 The Court held, however, that the National
Organization was required to show that PLAN engaged in a "pattern of
racketeering" in order to successfully bring a RICO claim. 3' As a
predicate to proving a RICO violation, the National Organization had
the burden of proving that PLAN had violated the Hobbs Act. 3' The
Court remanded the case for further proceedings, and in 1998, a jury in
Chicago found PLAN and its leaders guilty of 21 counts of extortion
under the Hobbs Act.37
IV. NOW II
Following the 1998 jury decision, PLAN appealed to the Seventh
Circuit on the grounds that the National Organization had failed to
prove the predicate to the RICO claim; that PLAN had in fact violated
the Hobbs Act.38 PLAN asserted that extortion, as defined by the Hobbs
Act, is "the obtaining of property from another, without his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear," and that PLAN had not obtained any such property. 39 The
Seventh Circuit rejected the argument on the basis that the legislative
history of the Hobbs Act indicated that the Act did not require that the
extortionist actually receive property.40 PLAN subsequently appealed
the ruling of the Seventh Circuit to the United States Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, referred to as NOW II, went against
a long line of precedent in holding that PLAN did not commit extortion
under the Hobbs Act because it did not "obtain" property. 41 Instead,
PLAN merely deprived the plaintiffs of their property without actually
acquiring it for itself42 The Court concluded that when a defendant
merely deprives a plaintiff of property without actually acquiring it, he
is not an extortionist. Therefore, in order for PLAN to be liable, the
Supreme Court said it must actually acquire the property of the
14 Id. at 259.
35 Id. at 262.
36 Id.
37 Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2001).
38 Id. at 709.
39 id.
40 Id.
41 Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003).
42 Id. at 404-05.
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National Organization, not merely deprive the Organization of the use
of its own property or the exercise of its own rights.
43
V. NOW III
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in NOW II, the National
Organization raised new arguments that PLAN's actions were indeed
within RICO's reach, and the Supreme Court again granted certiorari in
2005. The National Organization argued that the jury in the 1998 trial
had found "4 acts or threats of physical violence to person and
property," and that these four acts were also violations of the Hobbs
Act, independent of extortion, and therefore the four acts satisfied the
predicate requirement to a RICO claim.
44
On February 28, 2006, the Supreme Court's decision ended
the tumultuous twenty-year litigation.45 The Court rejected the National
Organization's argument that the Hobbs Act prohibits freestanding acts
of violence by holding that "physical violence unrelated to robbery or
extortion falls outside the scope of the Hobbs Act. ' 46 In order to reach
this decision, the Court interpreted the wording of the Hobbs Act under
a restrictive reading.47
Some critics are of the view that the Court's narrow
interpretation of the Hobbs Act is "inconsistent with the construction of
the Act by federal courts during the last forty years."48 Critics of the
Court's decision also argue that the Court's interpretation of the Hobbs
Act would have prevented past successful prosecutions of organized
crime members, had it previously been interpreted so narrowly.
49
Critics feel that the Court's reading of the Hobbs Act will serve only to
431 Id. at 409.
44 Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 396 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2005).
41 Scheidler v.Nat'l Org. for Women, 126 S. Ct. 1264 (2006).
4 6 1d. at 1270.
47 Id. Specifically at issue in NOW III was the interpretation of the phrase that
modifies "physical violence": "in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of the Hobbs Act." Id.
48 Mary Hamm, Torts-RICO-Predicate Crime of Extortion Requires that the
Defendant Obtain or Attempt to Obtain Property, 71 TENN. L. REv. 365, 380 (2004).
49 Matthew T. Grady, Extortion May No Longer Mean Extortion After Scheidler v.
National Organization for Women, Inc., 81 N. DAK. L. REv. 33, 60 (2005).
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undermine the effectiveness of the Act as a tool for law enforcement
and prosecution of organized crime.
50
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF SCHEIDLER
As a result of this decision, reproductive health clinics must look to
legal alternatives to RICO to ensure their clients access to legal and
safe abortions. Reproductive health clinics are afforded legal protection
from abortion protestors through two primary routes: state statutes and
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE).5"
However, critics of Scheidler feel that neither of these routes
sufficiently protect reproductive health clinics and their employees
because they do not address many of the activities undertaken by
abortion protestors.
In addition to general state laws, some states have passed
statutes that specifically attempt to prevent violence towards
reproductive health clinics. The intent of these statutes is to provide
reproductive health clinics, their employees, and their patients,
protection against threats of violence, destruction of property, and
trespass.52 In spite of these state laws, health clinics are still faced with
situations in which state laws are not enforced, causing them to seek
federal intervention.53 There are a number of reasons why state statutes
fall short of their goals to protect health clinics, their employees, and
their patients. Abortion providers and seekers have found, and may
continue to find, local authorities unwilling to enforce clinic or patient
rights because local police and prosecutors support the protestors'
cause. 54 Another situation in which state statutes fail to protect clinics
and their affiliates is when the police are simply unable to control the
sheer number of protestors.55 In addition to a lack of manpower, local
governments may be precluded from assisting clinics simply because of
a lack of allocated resources. 56 Even in cases where state governments
50 Id. at 35.
51 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
52 These states include, but are not limited to: Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-9-
122 (West 2004); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3721(2) (1995 & Supp. 2005);
Maryland, Md. Code. Ann., Crim. Law. 10-201 (LexisNexis 2002); North Carolina,
N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-277.2 (2005).
53 Nona LaPlante, Clinic Blockades: What is the Problem? What is the Harm? What
is the Solution?, 3 CIRCLES: BUFF. WOMEN'S J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 15, 21 (1995).
54 Id.
55 Id
56 Id. at 22-23.
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are able to intercede on behalf of clinics, "the possible criminal
punishments faced by the perpetrators under state law are remarkably
slight."
57
Congress passed FACE in 1994 in order to protect clinics,
abortion providers, as well as women seeking abortions from the acts of
protestors.58 FACE prohibits the use of "force or threat of force or
physical obstruction to intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere with
a person obtaining or providing health services., 59 FACE also prohibits
"intentional damage or destruction of the property of a facility."
60
Although FACE seeks to protect abortion providers and abortion
patients, the statute is only applicable to a limited group of people. The
statute sets forth that "only a person involved in providing or seeking to
provide, or obtaining or seeking to obtain, services in a facility can
bring a suit for force, threats of force, or physical obstruction." '61 The
wording of the statute indicates that there must be actual force, threats
of force, or physical obstruction combined with actual or attempted
intentional injury, intimidation, or interference, or an intentional
destruction motivated by the facility's services, in order to provide a
cause of action.6 2 As a result, FACE is not able to provide
comprehensive protection to clinics, and those who seek to obtain or
provide abortions. Specifically, FACE cannot be used to protect clinics
from economic attack by anti-abortion groups seeking to put clinics out
of business. 63 Additionally, FACE does not apply to the anti-abortion
groups and protestors who coordinate attacks, and is limited only to
protestors who actually participate in the attacks.64 FACE provides
clinics, their employees, and their clients only a limited amount of
protection.
65
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Scheidler v.
National Organization for Women, Inc., in addition to the current state
of the law with regard to the limitations placed on abortion protestors,
reproductive health clinics and their affiliates are afforded less
protections for their rights. The Scheidler decision, as well as the
57 Grady, supra note 49, at 35-36.
" 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
'9 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (2000).
60 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(3) (2000).
61 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(A) (2000).
62 Id.
63 Audra K. Hamilton, RICO, the Unexpected Protector Unveiled in National
Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 48 ARK. L. REv. 851, 874-75 (1995).




deficiencies in the current legislation, will allow anti-abortion
organizations to continue to economically terrorize reproductive health
clinics without facing liability. The repercussions of this case affect not
only the rights afforded to anti-abortion activists, but also serve to
erode the availability of low-cost gynecologic and obstetric care
because many of these clinics are not limited solely to abortion
services. As a result of the current state of the law and the lack of
protection afforded to such clinics, affordable prenatal care,
contraceptives, and HIV/AIDS testing could become more difficult to
obtain.
66
66 S. REP. No. 103-117, at 5 (1993).
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